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L Introduction 
South Korea underwent fundamental economic and social transformation 
from the l%Os. Within three decades, a once-poor, overwhelmingly agrarian 
society was transformed into a nation with the fastest economic growth rate in 
the world and strong middle-class social aspirations. In terms of politics, how-
ever, the country remained, until the mid-1980s, a case where democracy 
lagged far behind the dynamic economy and society of increasing complexity. 
It was only in 1987 that South Korea entered an era of Significant political trans-
formation and made a decisive tum away from authoritarianism to democracy. 
Since then, Korean politics has been characterized by a search for a political 
structure that aims to achieve both economic prosperity and political democra-
cy. 
South Korea has lived under six Republics since 1948, each having its di..'ltinc-
tive constitutional arrangements. A peaceful transfer of power took place for 
the first time in October 1987 with the advent of the Sixth Republic. President 
Kim Young Sam, who took office in February 1993, was South Korea's first 
"This is a revised paper that I presented for the panel on "Korea on the Threshold of the New 
Millennium" at the 2000 EWC/EWCA International Conference, "Building an Asia Pacific 
Community," Honolulu, Hawaii, July 4,13, 2000. 
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civilian president in three decades. The election of President Kim Dae Jung, a 
long-time opposition leader, in December 1997, marked a new milestone, in 
which, for the first time, a peaceful and regular transfer of government took 
place from one party to another. Korean Society faces new challenges and 
opportunities as it enters the 21st Century. This paper will provide an overview 
of major issues and agendas of political development, as South Korea's new 
democracy moves to the next phase under President Kim Dae Jung. The eco-
nomic crisis and President Kim's reform politics, decision-making and political 
culture, major political institutions and processes - such as the election, party 
system, and legislature - will be analyzed. 
n. Economic Crisis and Reform Politics 
By the late 199Os, South Korea's national economy reached a crucial juncture. 
In the past, low labor costs made it possible to sustain dynamic growth through 
export-led expansion. As time passed, however, industries had to be upgraded 
to achieve high-tech production and remain internationally competitive. But 
excessive wage increases, high capital costs, exacerbated bureaucratic red tape, 
not to mention institutionalized corruption, ended up weakening the global 
competitiveness of the economy. The chaebols, mainly family-run conglomer-
ates that served South Korea well as the engine of growth in the 1970s and 
1980s, lost their competitive edge in overseas export markets. Hence, demand 
grew to have the power of chaebols cut down. Meanwhile, external economic 
circumstances deteriorated, making the nation's economic prospects even 
worse. 
South Korea was at the height of its economic crisis in December 1997, when 
Kim Dae Jung was campaigning for the presidency. Having won the presiden-
cy by a narrow margin, President Kim faced the formidable task of steering the 
country's much-needed economic reform, while ensuring the process of demo-
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cratic consolidation in a nascent democracy. President Kim promised to reinvig-
orate the economy by trimming down the government and reducing red tape 
that stifled efficiency. He committed himself to striking a balance between labor 
and management, and pledged to introduce effective measures to support small 
and medium-sized enterprises. His administration also had to reshape the heav-
ily indebted financial sector to enable it to conform to the requirement'> of the 
IMF rescue package. All the while, he promised greater autonomy for banks 
and other fmancial institutions. The economic choices that President Kim had to 
make to keep these promises were vel)' hard. In fact, he had to demonstrate 
considerable leadership skills to implement the necessal)' economic reforms, 
while maintaining coherence in democratization programs. How effective has 
his leadership been in ensuring compatibility between economic reform and 
democratic consolidation? 
On the whole, South Korea's economy made a relatively rapid recovel)' 
under President Kim's earlier tenure. Upon taking office, President Kim intro-
duced a number of economic reform measures, some of which were consid-
ered "vel)' successful," perhaps more so than the ones employed by other 
Asian countries affected by the regional turmoil. Within a year. his government 
claimed having resolved the liquidity crisis that triggered the countl)"s virtual 
meltdown, and restored the pre-crisis growth level. In the meantime, Kim's 
government shut down 440 financial institutions, including five large commer-
cial banks. Government had written off some 92 trillion won of bad loans, 
while recapitaliZing all but two of the nation's 17 commercial banks to an 
internationally required level. It also strengthened regulations to make bank 
operations more transparent, stipulating that a bank's exposure to a single con-
glomerate should not exceed 25% of its total equity. The measure was to spur 
"more prudent lending" and force "many companies to raise capital on the 
stock market, where they face tougher public scnltiny."l) 
1) Quoted from Far Eastern Economic Review Qune 8, 2000) p. 70. 
460 
As a result, with major economic indicators posting strong rebounds, South 
Korea was said by many to have successfully overcome the crisis. South 
Korea's national output went up to 10.7% in 1999, compared to 6.7% drop in 
1998. Stockmarket Index rose from 300 during 1998 crisis to 1,000 by the end 
of 1999. During the first quarter of 2000, GDP soared again to 12.8010 from a 
year earlier.2J The fact, however, was that President Kim Dae Jung's economic 
reforms have been more popular in the outside world than at home. The 
refonns undertaken by the Kim administration in the labor, financial and corpo-
rate sectors have been hailed by many as "effective and successful." (Mo and 
Moon, 1999; Kim, 2000: 166-173) But reform in the government/public sector 
has been rather slow. One major challenge for the Korean government and 
President Kim Dae Jung was that, despite the macroeconomic achievements in 
his early years,3) public support for the president and his ruling party had been 
on a steady decline. Why was the public approval rating for the president and 
his party declining in spite of the visible recovery and returning confidence in 
Korea's political economy? 
Several accounts can be made for the declining popularity and legitimacy of 
Kim's regime. A simple reason given by those close to the ruling coalition is the 
so-called "anti-reform forces." This view often criticizes opposition parties for 
projecting an image of a government in "gridlock and disarray." "Without offer-
ing real alternatives," the opposition parties are said to "have faulted govern-
2) However, the economy slowed down again sharply beginning the second half of the year 
2000; to 6% GOP growth (estimate) and 500 of d1e stockmarket index for the last quarter. 
3) Opinions are divided, both at home and abroad, ahout the success of Kim Oae Jung and 
his government's economic rdorm as a whole. Many observers contend that the country's 
economic stmcture has not fundamentally changed, and there is still plenty to do to 
upgrade its international competitiveness. Far Eastern Economic Revieto commented in April 
20, 2000 that two years of economic reform under Kim Dae Jung's presidency "have engen-
dered" two new "biggest" problems: "paying down 200 trillion won in national debt and 
sovereign debt guarantees and closing the widening income gap between the rich and 
poor." 
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ment reform policies to score political points with their domestic constituen-
cies.,,4) A similar account puts the blame on the anti-Kim Dae Jung sentiment of 
the Youngnam people and their hostile attitudes towards refonn programs. 'The 
populous Youngnam provinces are also alleged to overlap largely with an area 
in South Korea where a majority is conservative and status quO-Oriented. To 
these people, the President's reform packages are said to be a threat to vested 
interests and privileged positions. However, the validity of this argument is 
questionable, as it fails to take into account the diversity and complexity of atti-
tude formation among people. Opposition parties, conservatives and the 
Youngnam people do not necessarily have identical policy preferences. Nor do 
people and organizations think or act solely on the basis of a common regional 
identity. 
Neo-liberalist critics tend to emphasize the limits and constraints of the 
'developmental state' of South Korea in initiating fundamental economic 
reforms. A developmental state can introduce economic reforms, some of 
which can be successful. But the reform here L<; quite different from the way 
neo-liberalL<;ts think of refoffil. They see it as being based on market prinCiples 
with institutionalized means and due legal pr(xesses. From this point of view, 
economic reform in South Korea has largely resulted from the personal leader-
ship and authority of the president, and not by due legal processes conforming 
to market rationality. That is, the government is at the center of economic poli-
cy making. Key deCision-making still remains in personalized channels of com-
mand, especially of the agents and executives mandated by presidential power. 
But the paradox is that, according to this view, the Korean state that was the 
4) One government sponsored conference report stated that. in citing Thailand's case, 
"attempts by opposition parties to exploit the (economic) crisis politically have helped 
erode public confidence by projecting the image of a government in gridlock and disarray." 
The Sejong In~titute and National Endowment for Democracy, Politics (1 Ecorwmic R,fbrm 
and Civil Society Responses, SUllunary of an International Conference. December 11-12, 
1999, Sungnam, Korea, p. 4. 
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cause of the crisis had to command the reform programs to recover the market 
rationality, which was lost during decades of neo-mercantilist policy. 
In this mode of reform, the economy can get by, as long as the president, his 
government and economic bureaucracy work effectively. If things go wrong in 
the public sector, as was the case with Indonesia's reform under Suharto, gov-
ernment-initiated reforms will be in serious trouble. Compared to the Western 
style of reform, there are three main dangers to this kind of reforn1S. First, eco-
nomic reforms, based mainly on personal relationships, can easily degenerate 
into corruption and crony capitalism. Second, a person-based reform tends to 
be biased against change, whenever there is a challenge to the status quo. Or 
the reform can be held captive by interest politiCS, most likely favoring the 
wealthy and the powerful. Third, in order for a personalized reform to be suc-
cessful, it requires a high-level of trust among the people in their political and 
business leaders. When people are cynical about their government and leaders, 
the reform is likely to fail. Korean society is particularly lacking in social trust 
and many people are cynical about the political elite and business leaders. 
Under these circumstances, it will be difficult for government-initiated refoffi1S 
to proVide the people with proper motives. 
Another, perhaps more immediate reason behind the low support for 
President Kim and his party is the failure of the new government to account for 
the "real issues" of political society. When Mr. Kim was elected to the presiden-
cy in the middle of an economic crisis, many people expected that he would 
bring a new leadership to a nation torn by regional rivalry and moral hazards. 
People wanted the new president to go deeper than a mere economic recov-
ery, reforming and restructuring the society to redress the "root causes of eco-
nomic malaise." But after two years of his presidency, people began to realize 
that President Kim's style of leadership did not meet their expectations. For 
example, he missed the right time and opportunity to act deciSively on political 
reform bills that were broadly supported by various civic groups. He failed to 
win broad national support by basing his appointment decisions on factors like 
Korean Democracy under Kim Dae jung I Chung-Si Ahn 463 
regional backgrounds or school ties. The President and the ruling camp refused 
to compromise with the opposition Grand National Party (GNP) that still has 
more seats in the National Assembly. Instead, it antagonized the opposition by 
resorting to divisive tactics such as a campaign to lure opposition assembly 
members to cross over and join the ruling party. 
This, in conjunction with growing social polarization, breakdown of the mid-
dle class and inadequate social safety net programs during the economic down-
turn, made the president and his party unable to fulfill the promises they made 
to the people.5) In addition, the potentially conflicting policy goals of the presi-
dent were proven largely ineffective and did not produce much result. For 
example, President Kim openly pledged to achieve a parallel development of a 
market economy and democracy. He also pledged in mid-1999 to introduce a 
new "productive welfare" scheme. However, these ambitious goals were largely 
viewed as being 'empty' of real content and thus 'confusing'. They were pri-
marily geared for political maneuvering, aimed at winning a majority in the 
general elections that were to be held on April 13, 2000. 
Despite the democratization, little has changed in the party polities of South 
Korea during President Kim's half tenure. In late 1999 when Kim Jong PH's 
United Liberal Democrats (ULD) broke away from the coalition with the 
President, the ruling camp was in desperate need of a big turnaround to win 
the upcoming general elections. In search of a winning strategy, President Kim 
decided in January 2000 to re-launch the ruling National Congress for New 
Politics (NCNP), the party he built less than three years ago to win his presiden-
5) In general, the imp-act of the economic crisis and the resulting shifts of the affected A~ian 
economies towards a neoliberal mode tend to favor the rich, stronger, well- organized, pro-
business groups, while discriminating those who are socially disadvantaged. Similarly, eco-
nomic policies and crisis management programs in South Korea for the last several years 
have been (:riticized for favoring the affluent classes and business corporations at the cost of 
a majority of the population. The common people, the poor and low-income citizens were 
main losers of the economic crisis. 
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cy, as the Millennium Democratic Party (MDP). But the plan did not work well; 
the MDP was not very successful in recruiting 'new and fresh faces' beyond the 
regional base of the Gholla provinces. Like all other political parties in Korea, 
the MDP remains mal-institutionalized, incapable of mediating the interests of 
social groups in political society, and run by the president himself along with a 
few oligarchic bosses who exploit regional cleavages for power gains. Parties 
have come and gone upon his decision with little change. 
Pre-election polls predicted pessimistic voting returns for the government 
party. Many voters were disillusioned by the administration's lack of progress in 
fighting corruptions among politiCians and bureaucrat 'i. President Kim's popu-
larity fell down sharply when a string of bribery and ethics scandals involving 
high officials was disclosed. Loss of the presidential popularity and mounting 
concern about the stalled political reform meant an increasing split votes 
among electorates along regional divisions. This in turn boosted opposition 
parties. President Kim needed a convincing majority of his party in the April 13 
general election in order to assert his authority and carry out the reform he 
started but was running out of steam. Only three days before the general elec-
tion, the government announced a plan to hold a summit meeting between 
President Kim and North Korea's Kim Jung-II. The sununit announcement was 
timed to give the new MDP a political advantage. However, it did not ease the 
disillusionment of voters, nor have a signifkant effect on hmv they voted. In 
the April 13 general elections, the MDP failed to win a majority in the National 
Assembly. The MDP won 115 seats, while the opposition Grand National Party 
(GNP) won 133 seats out of the total 273 seats. 
The election results again showed that the good economic record did not 
help President Kim and his party to win the support of the voters. It was also 
disturbing to see regional antagonism had gotten worse during the previous 
two years of his presidency. When he came into office, he had promised to 
ease the historic animosity between the Kyongsang and Ghotta regions. But 
instead he filled many top posts with natives of his Ghotta provinces. This 
Korean Democracy under Kim Daa jung / Chung-Si Ahn 465 
angered people in Youngnam, and the verdict of political division was clear. 
Not a single MDP candidate was elected in Youngnam, and not one member 
of the opposition won a seat in the Chotta area. In Chotta area, more than 90 
percent of the vote went to the president's ruling MDP party, while the same 
fraction went to the opposition party in the city of Pusan, the most populous 
city in Youngnam area. 
In result, the verdict of 2000 general election still left the crisis-tom country 
under a divided government. When Kim Dae Jung won the presidency in 1997, 
he had to form a governing coalition with Kim Jong Pil's lJIl). That coalition 
fell apart in December 1999. And now, even if he renewed the coalition with 
the lJIl), the presidential party would still not control a majority. He renewed 
his drive to lure independents, minority members of the assembly, and defec-
tors from the opposition. This further antagonized the ruling-opposition party 
relationships and stalled the MDP's initiatives in the national assembly. Thus, 
even a strong "imperial presidency" like that of Kim Dae Jung could not etTec-
tively govern the polity. With only two years left of Kim's five-year presidential 
term, South Korea still remains uncertain about an orderly succession of politi-
cal power. Debates over constitutional revision.<; are temporarily suspended in 
light of the very poor electoral records of the lJIl) in the last general election, 
whose top leader (Kim Jong Pi!) has been a long-time, outspoken advocate of 
parliamentarianism. But the constitutional issue is not completely mute. If not a 
shift to parliamentarianism, the current constitution may be amended soon to 
rectify some negative aspects of the current presidential system, including a 
change in the presidential term from a single 5-year to two consecutive 4-year 
terms. 
m. PoUtical Institutions and Processes 
Peculiar historical and institutional features of Korean politics have set a 'path 
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dependency' on South Korea's road to democracy. Principal political challenges 
that contemporaty South Korea faces are primarily the result of its historical 
experience and deVelopmental status as a new democracy. The constitution of 
the Republic of Korea adopted a modern Western system of government and 
political institutions under popular sovereignty, with separate executive, legisla-
tive, and judiCial branches and a bill of rights. But these institutional features 
have thus far been respected "more in form than in substance." The founding 
constitution adopted in 1948 was amended 9 times. The autocratic rule of 
Syngman Rhee during the First Republic set a bad example of manipulating the 
constitution through frequent amendments. Militaty leaders later usurped con-
stitutional power for some thirty years. The last amendment in 1987 wa.s the 
most significant one for democracy, a.s it restored the long-fought popular elec-
tion of the president and strengthened guarantees of individual rights. Since 
then three presidents ran the Sixth Republic, with the basic structure of govern-
ment remaining essentially the same. 
Following South Korea's liberation and independence, the establishment of 
new political institutions 'preceded' - rather than 'followed' - the expansion 
of mass political participation and the mobilization of new social groups into 
politics. (Khil, 1984: 53-54; Abn, 1993) This made Korean politiCS suffer from 
"politiCS of mobilization" (unilateralM led from above, rather than evolving 
from civic society (interactively) and participatoty activities initiated from below 
(voluntari(v). In the Korean context, political mobilization led from above had a 
tendency to reinforce top-down politics, political authoritarianism both at the 
top and the bottom, a hierarchical pattern of authority relationship, and central-
ized direction of political activities. The trend was maintained consistently until 
the 19805. Only in recent years, the development of political institutions began 
to correspond more closely with the demands and need of the political society 
and citizen participation. And bottom-up politics started to develop slowly and 
gradually in Korean society, as civic organizations became outspoken and labor 
movement" increasingly volatile. 
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In the meantime, Korean society had to suffer acutely from a growing gap 
between political institutionalization and political participation as well as the 
disharmony between the two. Changes in politk.-al institutions and progresses 
made in their processes for the last decade of democratization have been 
remarkable and positive. Yet, they have been slow, sometimes painful, and 
took a longer time than the development in the social and economic spheres. 
This gap has led to the general feeling of institutional performance lagging 
behind expectations, mass dissatisfaction and alienation from politics, percep-
tion of a widening elite-mass cleavage, low trust in public agencies, and weak 
legitimacy of the governing elite and political institutions in the eyes of the 
public. "Mass politics and culture in democratizing Korea" is well known for a 
lack of trust and low confIdence on the part of the public in government pro-
grams and public services.6) For example, schools, the heath care system, pen-
sion fund management, and financial institutions have increasingly been 
viewed as "ineffective," "unresponsive," "unfair" and "unreliable." Various state 
agencies - courts, political parties, police, tax administration, and so on - are 
viewed as "corrupted," "high-handed," "costly," and "unaccountable." 
Opinion surveys in Korea keep warning that a majority of citizens do not 
have trust in the government and their leaders. Diminishing public confidence 
in political institutions will undermine the legitimacy of the state and its proper 
operations. Worsening legitimacy weakens the basic capacity of government 
institutions to function and produce public goocL'i. Also, declining commitment 
in the public sector disengages people from social "activeness" and retracts 
them to over-rely on "personal trust" primarily embedded in kinship, regional 
identity, or closed and informal patron-client relationship. That is, "social capi-
tal" will erode?) When a political society is poorly endowed with 'positive' 
6) Doh C. Shin systematically analyzed mass political culture of South Korea in his recent book 
with a same tide. Mass Politics and Culture in Democratizing Korea, Camhridge l:niversity 
Press, 1999. 
7) Social capital is defmed hy Putnam (993) and others (Fukuyama, 199') as the community 
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social capital, the civil society cannot grow and mature, and integrate the inter-
ests of individuals and social groups. Participation by Koreans in voluntary 
social associations is low, while associations based on primary relations such as 
kinship, school ties, localities and regions are strongly identified and taken 
much more seriously. In Korean society, individual interest and personal trust 
do not add up to higher social capital or "civic" culture. Perhaps, Korean soci-
ety - like many other Asian societies - nowadays requires a new basis for 
integration. The state may have to reorient its national political development 
strategy. Political institutions in tum are to be reshaped so as to nurture a new 
form of positive 'political capital.' 
In sum, the 21st Century challenges of the globalizing political economy and 
the wave of democratic upturn pose formidable tasks for the state, political 
leadership and civil society in South Korea. How responsive are the major 
political institutions and their processes in meeting the challenges? How effec-
tive are they in performing the tasks of democratic consolidation? What 
progress has been made so far in the political institutionalization of democratic 
processes? 
IV. Democratic ConsoHdatioo: Progress and Prognosis 
Electoral Politics: 
The performance of South Korea's electoral politics has been poor until 
recently. The values of election like choosing the elite or changing poliCies 
have been respected in principle. But in reality, a typical response to election 
culture indispensable for facilitating the formation of voluntaty associations, making citizens 
trust and cooperate in the larger social context, ensuring democratic performance of the 
state and local political institutions, promoting economic prosperity, and solVing the dilem-
ma of collective action by keeping a polity from entrapping excessive egoism and authori-
tarian temptations. 
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results has been increased repression and authoritarian regression rather than 
improvements in leadership and policies. For example, a rigged election in 
1960 led to the downfall of the Syngman Rhee regime; and the near-defeat of 
President Park Chung Hee in 1971 led to the establishment of a more authori-
tarian government structure. Nevertheless, the succeeding regimes allowed 
periodic elections in South Korea to choose representatives and presidents, 
brCY<ldening the base of mass p'<lrticipation in political life. Also, it was mainly 
through the electoral process that the political system has been able to provide 
a "non-violent channel for public displeasure." (Macdonald, 1998: 125) 
16 general elections for the national assembly have been held since 1948, 
largely by direct vote. Of the fifteen presidential elections, eight times have 
been by direct popular vote, twice by the legislature, and five by electoral col-
leges. Local elections were held first in 1952, but suspended in 1961, only to be 
restored 30 years later in 1991. Full elections for councils and heads of local 
government.') were held in 1995. Before democratization, elections were often 
carried out as a matter of routine, and formalistic aLt of ratifying elite decisions. 
After democratization, elections have become more regular and transparent, 
and have come to be perceived as legitimate channels for participation. 
Growing demands by the population, with student.') and intellectuals in the 
forefront, for more freedom, equality, and voice in public decisions helped 
greatly in this process. 
Despite these developments, South Korea's electoral process still does not 
provide a strong base for a liberal, responsive, representative democracy to 
take full shape. Although the rules of the electoral games have been made 
more regular and predictable, the underlying basis of party politics and candi-
date nomination has not markedly changed. Neither does the election outcome 
Significantly affect the president's domestic and international agendas. Voters in 
South Korea are still fed up with party infighting, scandals, and corruption in 
election periods. Few clear ideological and policy differences can be found 
between parties and their nominees. People say they "want to change politi-
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cians," but they have no proper candidates as "the bosses control the entry 
gates." The National Election Commission reported that 16% of the 1,153 candi-
dates who ran in the last general elections had criminal records warranting 
prison terms. Around half of them were reportedly convicted for "socially unac-
ceptable" crimes such as tax evasion, bribery and assault. Civic groups came up 
with a "blacklist" of unacceptable candidates, and openly appealed to citizens 
to vote against them. The list included, on top of the criminally convicted, those 
who evaded mandatory military service, or were involved in scandals or associ-
ated with the previous military regimes. The campaign drew a considerable 
amount of public attention and was particularly highly supported by younger, 
progressive voters, including college students. 
These observations attest to the fact that South Korean voters are still racked 
by the legacy of the past, and will have to continue their uphill battle for a 
renewed political life. Adding to this 'political fatigue', the nation's political 
process remains torn by 'personalism' in deciSion-making, divisive regionalism, 
a lack of tolerance and compromise in political culture, and a party system 
incapable of tuning itself to the increasingly pluralizing and contentious citizens 
and social groups. 
Decision Making and Political Culture: 
South Korea's political process has long been centered on the presidency 
and the central administrative branch of the government. The President is con-
stitutionally empowered with extensive prerogatives. The justification for the 
all-powerful executive has been that it is necessary to contain North Korean 
threat to national security and maintain rapid economic growth. The presidents 
often usurped the executive prerogatives on the pretext of threats to national 
security and economic growth. The monolithic power structure with the presi-
dent at the center has remained virtually untouched throughout the change of 
times and regimes, and the process of modernization. Power below the presi-
dent has been characterized by "subordination, submission, and passiveness." 
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(Paik, 1991) The current presidential system accepts the preponderant power of 
the presidency. Such an arrangement may be functionally acceptable, if the 
president exercL'ies his power for the collective good. But under poor executive 
management, the system does not provide sufficient institutional checks to 
counter poor decisions. 
On the other hand, the national assembly has never been strong and always 
remained subordinate to the presidency. Politicians at the local level have been 
weak in autonomy and dependent on central control and administrative guid-
ance. Cabinet members, including the prime minister, have been chosen by the 
president, a majority of whom usually (but not necessarily) from outside the 
national assembly. They act principally as administrative heads, having rarely 
been allowed to build their own independent political power base. They are 
also in office only for a brief period of one year or two at most.B) In short, the 
personalization of presidential power has characterized Korean politics as a 
one-man-rule system. Successive presidents have ruled the country almost as 
"elected autocrats." Three presidents of the Sixth Republic in democratizing 
Korea - Roh Tae Woo, Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung - were not the 
exceptions. 
This one-man-rule elite system has been persistently challenged by opposi-
tion parties, student activists, intellectuals and progressive Christian forces, that 
led the movement politics in the 1970s and 1980s. The democratic transition 
afterwards brought about the direct election of the president, diminution of 
executive power, elimination of the pervasive military influence in government, 
more press freedom and the implementation of democratic rights. While the 
presidential power is being curtailed gradually in recent years to allow more 
flexibility, responsiveness, and checks and balance, the preponderance and 
domination of the executive power strU<.ture is still a major target of political 
8) The average tenure of South Korea's cahinet ministers since 1947 was around one year and 
eighteen months. Ministerial tenureship tend~ to become even shorter under the democratic 
governments of Roh Tae Woo, Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae lung. 
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bickering and criticism. The opposition Grand National Party that controls the 
majority now has attempted to use the national assembly as the center of policy 
contention. But the system remains essentially the same, and the old practices 
still persist. In effect, the president is not accountable to the parliament; monop-
olizes the cabinet appointment and executive power; presides his own party, 
and more importantly, controls the nomination process. 
In addition, informal decision making practices playa significant role in the 
actual process both in the government and private sector. Rules and regulations 
often do not reflect the real process in the high politics of South Korea. 
(Hwang, 1966: 315), The more important and contentious the decisions, the 
more likely they are made on the basis of an informal, narrowly based, closed 
elite system. Informalism produces a factional polity. For example, top posi-
tions in the Blue House and elite bureaucrats are recruited and promoted 
through infolmal networks. In informal politics, factions are frequently formed 
around kimhip, common geographic localities or shared academic training. 
Factiom also coalesce around a charismatic politician who is capable of offer-
ing his followers the prospect of political, social or economic advancement. As 
the primary grouping factor is the desire for power, it is difficult to distinguish 
factions by any fundamental differences in political values or policy positions. 
Also, as political advancement in factional polities is dependent to a great 
degree upon the protection and backing of a powerful patron, it is not uncom-
mon for politicians to express greater loyalty to their patron than to a policy 
position. As a result, in factional politic'), much of the energy in the decision 
making process is wasted on the "contention" itself rather than being devoted 
to the "deliberation" of substantive policy issues. 
Personalism, informalism and factionalism have been dominant features in 
Korean politics. They are often attributed to the lack of key cultural elements 
necessary for building a healthy representative democracy. Personalism in 
power tend" to consolidate authority and political initiative in the hand" of the 
president. The process distorts the elite recruitment system by recruiting only 
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those subservient to the charismatic leader. The elites are often recruited on the 
basis of personal trusteeship and ascriptive criteria, as they can easily be dis-
missed whenever confidence is lost or the leader falls from power. Because of 
this, the political culture of submission and compliance to authority is kept 
unchanged. Informalism in decision-making causes corruption, scandals and 
secrecy. It also widens the elite-mass cleavage in their perception of political 
issues, and keeps causing disrespect for authority and power holders. 
Factionalism creates an elite system that is prone to conspiratorial activities. 
Also, it slows down the development of viable political parties. When and 
where factionalism counts, little attention is paid to the expansion of proactive 
civic participation or the development of political parties tilat are necessary to 
build broad ideological bases of support. Also, party members will support 
their leader unconditionally in the hope that he will attain power and bestow 
advantages upon hL., followers. Contemporary political patties in South Korea 
are notable for their factional strife. All political parties have failed to establish a 
broad mass base of political support. Parties have rested largely upon the top 
down organization rather than popular support of social groups. In conse-
quence, the party system remains highly unstable, short-lived. and mal-institu-
tionalized. (Alm & Jaung, 1999) Parties perfonn only a few functions within the 
political system. Primary amongst these functions is to "formalize" the process 
of candidate nomination in election times. In non-election years, the parties are 
less active and usually subordinate to the personal commands of the top power 
holders. 
The impact of the aforementioned process is responsible for making the 
political culture of South Korea easily subject to tile "zero-sum politics," or what 
G. Henderson called the "politics of the vortex," the key features of which are 
centralization, factionalism and authoritarianism. (Henderson, 1968; Macdonald, 
1988) When power and politics are considered a "business of life and death" to 
the partiCipants, it is likely that elections will also be seen as a life-or-death 
issue and is highly costiy. And once elected, the power is easily corruptible. 
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Severe power struggles and competitions also allow little room for compromis-
es, negotiations, and tolerance, all of which are considered essential for a 
mature representative democracy. Thus, South Korea's politics-ciominant society 
tends to intensify the conflict and struggle for power hegemony, and in tum 
breed internal rivalry and factional competition among closed, unstable, less 
autonomous elite groups. The rule of rulers and culture of political authoritari-
anism can easily preempt the rule of law and institutions. Korea's Confucian 
traditions have additionally contributed to the authoritarian political culture in 
which rulers rule and take it for granted that the masses will follow the com-
mands of elite leadership. In consequence, the new democracy in South Korea 
is still locked in a political system of "elected autocracy" or "imperial presiden-
cy." 
In the past, the existence of a hostile regime in the north has strengthened 
South Korea's political culture of authoritarianism. The fear of military threat 
and invasion from North Korea often justified the need for a strong government 
and a commanding authoritarian leadership centered on the personality of the 
president. The question now is, what effects will the easing of tensions 
between the two Koreas have on the politic'> and culture of South Korea? 
V. Conclusion: Assessing Kim Dae}ung's leadership 
As South Korea enters the twenty-first century, it is confronted with the dou-
ble needs of having to revitalize the economy and consolidate its democracy. 
The democratization process of the past decade helped the polity to move irre-
verSibly from an authoritarian to democratic system. Yet, the legacies of the 
authoritarian past - personalization of power, elite rule, regional cleavages, a 
lack of institutionalized political processes - are blocking the nation's path 
towards a mature democracy. The age-old culture and practices of the political 
authoritarianism have persisted in spite of the evolVing democratic contexts. A 
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national consensus has been lacking on the agenda for both economic restruc-
turing and political democracy. Kim Dae Jung won his presidency at the end of 
the 1997, when South Koreans found the nation nearly tom by "democratic 
fatigue" and "moral hazard." His ascendancy to power after a life-long democ-
ratic struggle was hailed by many of his countrymen, if not overwhelmingly, as 
an opportunity to set the nation embattled by political divisions onto a new 
developmental course. 
Kim's early presidency helped the country to recover quickly from the dra-
matic currency crisis of the late 1997. The crisis also called forth "an impressive 
unity among Koreans," one that would have empowered his leadership to set 
the fIre to accomplish "the second building of the Korean nation." However, as 
far as the domestic reform is concerned and democratic consolidation in partic-
ular, Kim Dae Jung's presidency for the past three years is judged as having 
"squandered the opportunities," largely by "continuing to lead the country in an 
autocratic way."9) As a matter of fact, the effect of the 1997 economic crisis has 
led Kim's government to "reinforce," rather than challenge, "the personalization 
and centralization of the political system." President Kim made a breakthrough 
with the North Korea in 2000. But so far, he has failed to build a domestic con-
sensus to support his "sunshine policy." The key also is that North Korea is yet 
to show real commitment and visible movement for internal change and 
reform, if not fully reciprocating to the South's offer. 
Coming to power with a minority constituency, the president had to form his 
fIrst cabinet with a coalition of Kim Jong Phil's backing. Since then, he has not 
really tried to build new constituencies for his power and policies. Instead, he 
tried to govern with a mix of 'old boys network' of his personal aids formed 
during his life-long exile and jail, "loyal outsiders" and "sitting bureaucrats." 
9) Quotations here and after in the concluding section are from the Report of the Pacific 
Council on International Polity Task Force, entitled as "Assessing Korea and Promoting 
Change," Second Meeting, Yonsei University, Seoul, Korea (December 13, 2000). This 
report was rnade available to me by one of the participants. 
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Many of his hand picked high officials turned out to be "inexperienced," "inef-
fective" or "not quite fit for governing," and they had to be replaced constantly 
by the pre-existing pool of limited people whom the president personally 
favored. In effect, Kim Dae Jung and his government talked about many reform 
agenda, but brought about little visible effects in reality. Reform programs in 
the labor, social security, business sector, public corpomtions, and government 
opemtions were seemingly impressive, but they proved to be "disconnected 
from both the country's political and economic possibilities." 
The April 2000 geneml election was taken as a "virtual referendum" on Kim's 
presidential leadership and policy position.<;. The result vividly showed a dimin-
ishing confidence in the presidential leadership. The regional divisions in 
Korean politics became more striking, and even worsening under his presiden-
cy. President Kim's autocmtic leadership style is being discredited not only by 
his opponents but also by the country's mainstream social and economic elites, 
including intellectuals. He is deeply distrusted by business sector, and perceived 
as a radical populist. Chaebols view his anti-chaebol policy as "ideological 
revenge, not as sensible economics." Trust and credibility of his leadership is 
also being lost in the labor, which was for long his own constituency. With 
Kim's presidency less than two years to go and having failed to build a broad 
constituency, people have already begun to talk about early lame duck. It is 
also said that, "even his Nobel Prize was controversial beneath the surface in 
Korea," and that, having exhausted power base, "even his friends have begun 
to worry about his capacity for governing" and "are openly concerned about 
the next several years." 
In sum, South Korea's political system faces a number of challenges in the 
advent of a new century of economic globalization and amid a worldwide 
spread of democmtization in the post-Cold War context. First, Korean politics 
should become "more formal, less personalized and less centrJ.lized." Second, 
the quality of political leadership and government performance needs to be 
improved in order to meet the citizen')' growing demands and rising expecta-
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tions. Third, economic refonns and democratization programs have to be better 
coordinated so as to upgrade the quality of life for the people at large and help 
create a renewed sense of social integration, political legitimacy and cultural 
identity. Forth, political institutions and their processes should be reshaped to 
promote positive social values. What is needed most and urgently in Korean 
society is more trust and credibility in leadership and policy deliberation. Fifth, 
the values, goals and norms of democracy and the rule of law need to be firm-
ly rooted in the culture and behavior of the people as well as of the elite. 
Finally. the future of the Korean democracy depend,> largely on whether it 
develops a social and economic base that can lead to a peaceful reunification 
of the two Koreas, and thus give the people of North Korea an opportunity to 
live under democratic rule. 
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